We theoretically and empirically explore the explainability benefits of adversarial learning in logistic regression models on structured datasets. In particular we focus on improved explainability due to significantly higher feature-concentration in adversarially-learned models: Compared to natural training, adversarial training tends to much more efficiently shrink the weights of non-predictive and weaklypredictive features, while model performance on natural test data only degrades slightly (and even sometimes improves), compared to that of a naturally trained model. We provide a theoretical insight into this phenomenon via an analysis of the expectation of the logistic model weight updates by an SGD-based adversarial learning algorithm, where examples are drawn from a random binary data-generation process. We empirically demonstrate the feature-pruning effect on a synthetic dataset, some datasets from the UCI repository, and real-world large-scale advertising response-prediction data-sets from MediaMath. In several of the MediaMath datasets there are 10s of millions of data points, and on the order of 100,000 sparse categorical features, and adversarial learning often results in model-size reduction by a factor of 20 or higher, and yet the model performance on natural test data (measured by AUC) is comparable to (and sometimes even better) than that of the naturally trained model. We also show that traditional 1 regularization does not even come close to achieving this level of feature-concentration We measure "feature concentration" using the Integrated Gradients-based feature-attribution method of [1] and derive a new closed-form expression for 1-layer networks, which substantially speeds up computation of aggregate feature attributions across a large dataset.
Introduction
While deep learning models have been wildly successful in a variety of perceptual (images, audio, video) and text domains, a number of authors have recently highlighted two important concerns with such models:
Adversarial Examples: Many of these models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks: it is possible for an adversary to perturb the inputs in such a way that humans perceive no significant change (and in particular they would assign the same "label" as the original example), and yet the model's label or prediction can be markedly different [2, 3] . Adversarial training has recently been proposed as a method for training models that are robust to such attacks [4, 5] . Feature Attribution: Especially for complex models, but even for simple linear models, it is often not clear how to quantify the impact of an input feature on the model's final output. Such a quantification is crucial in order to understand which features are important (and unimportant) in determining a model's behavior on specific inputs, or to understand which features are important in aggregate. This understanding can highlight a model's strengths or weaknesses and can aid in improving the models or help instill trust in the models (especially in domains such as health-care). A few different feature attribution methodologies have been proposed recently [6, 7] , and [8, 9] are two recent surveys of various explanation methods for black-box models. In particular [1] formulate a set of axioms that any good feature-attribution method should satisfy and identify a specific method, which they call Integrated Gradients (IG) that satisfies all of these axioms.
Much of the recent work on Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) has focused on perceptual domains or text, and "structured" datasets have been largely ignored. Moreover, AML research has been primarily concerned with producing adversarially robust models, and the conventional wisdom is that adversarial robustness comes at the cost of (often significant) loss in classification performance on natural examples [10] [11] [12] .
For example in [13] the authors create a synthetic dataset where they demonstrate a tradeoff between "standard" accuracy (i.e. accuracy on natural unperturbed examples), and adversarial accuracy (i.e. accuracy on adversarially perturbed examples). In particular they show, on their synthetic dataset, that as standard accuracy approaches 100%, adversarial accuracy falls to zero. Other tradeoffs have also been considered in the literature, such as the need for more training data to achieve adversarial robustness [14] .
The emphasis in this paper is different in a few ways. We explore adversarial training, not in perceptual or text domains, but in structured datasets (which for all practical purposes can be thought of as tabular datasets such as those arising from health-care, advertising, or a variety of other application areas). Our primary interest in this paper is not adversarial robustness, but rather an intriguing side-benefit of adversarial training:
Adversarial training (with ∞ -bounded perturbations) can be used to produce models significantly more concentrated than their naturally-trained counterparts, with minimal or no impact on the performance on natural data, particularly in logistic probability-prediction models applied to structured datasets. Moreover, this effect is not achievable by traditional 1 regularization.
We use the term feature-concentration (or "model compression", or "model concentration") informally to refer to the extent to which the learned model differentiates between "relevant" and "less relevant" or "irrelevant" features. (See below for more on measuring feature concentration). An aspect of adversarial training that we are especially interested in, is its ability to weed out non-predictive features that exhibit spurious correlation with the label on finite datasets. This is clearly important from an explainability viewpoint: We would like our trained model to not learn significant weights on such irrelevant features.
It is now standard to view adversarial training as a process similar to the usual model-training where a certain loss function is minimized, except that each d-dimensional input instance x is altered by an adversary by adding a d-dimensional perturbation δ to x, where the adversary chooses δ = δ * in the "worst" possible way given the current model state and certain constraints (a formal description appears in Section 2). The constraint on the adversary is typically in the form of a bound ε on the ∞ -norm of δ. The key difficulty in scaling up adversarial training to large datasets is the computation of this worst-case δ * at each input sample point. For a general model there is often no choice but to apply an iterative optimization procedure such as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) at each sample point to compute this δ * . However for linear models (such as logistic or poisson) we derive a simple closed-form expression (Lemma 2.1 in Section 2) for δ * under 1 -norm and 2 -norm constraints. This result makes makes it practical to incorporate adversarial training into a learning system based on logistic or other linear models.
We use this closed form expression to derive our main theoretical result that sheds light on the feature-concentration effect of adversarial training: In Section 2.2 we show bounds on the expectation of the logistic weight update when a Stochastic Gradient Descent algorithm is applied to data points generated from an idealized data-generation process, where the data-points are perturbed by an ∞ -bounded adversary according to the closed-form expression mentioned above. These results hint at the existence of a goldilocks zone of ε values that are "just right": large enough to suppress irrelevant or weakly-relevant features, and yet small enough to preserve performance on natural test data.
Inspired by the synthetic dataset of [13] , we define a synthetic dataset (Section 3) to expressly designed to dramatically highlight the contrast between adversarial training and natural training in their ability to ignore irrelevant features. In contrast to the theoretical analysis of [13] , we conduct SGD-based adversarial training experiments on this dataset. Our synthetic dataset contains a mix of predictive and purely random non-predictive features, and natural training tends to learn significant weights on the non-predictive features (with the weights sometimes being bigger than those of the predictive features), whereas adversarial training acts as an efficient sieve that weeds out the non-predictive features by pushing their weights close to zero, while still leaving the predictive features with significant weights, hence only minimally impacting performance on natural test data (and sometimes even improving the performance).
How do we quantify feature concentration? One possibility, applicable to linear models, is based on the weights of the features (see the measures Wts.L1 and Wts.1Pct defined in Section 5.1). We also consider concentration measures using the more principled Integrated Gradients (IG) based approach of [1] . Specifically we compute each feature's "importance" using their methodology, and then measure "concentration" based on how this measure varies across features (see Section 5.1 for details).
The core of the IG method is an expression for the contribution of a given feature-dimension i to a specific prediction p(x) on an input sample x. This expression involves a line integral over gradients computed along the straight-line path from a certain baseline input x to the actual input x. Computing this integral in general requires an approximation based on gradients computed at m equally spaced points on this straight-line path. This is reasonably efficient to compute for a single datapoint x and single dimension i. However in this paper we are interested in repeatedly computing this quantity across all dimensions (which could number into the hundreds of thousands when there are high-cardinality categorical features), over an entire dataset (which could contain millions of records). Fortunately, we are able to show a closed-form formula for the IG-based attribution for 1-layer neural networks (Lemma 4.1 in Section 4.1). While the IG methodology of [1] focuses on feature-attribution for a single sample point, for our purposes we also want to quantify the overall importance of a feature in a model, aggregated over a specific dataset. In Section 4.2 we introduce a simple, intuitive methodology to compute such an aggregate feature-importance metric we call the Feature Impact.
In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 we describe our experiments on toy datasets from the UCI repository, and large scale real-world advertising datasets from MediaMath respectively. In these experiments we compare results from natural training and adversarial training where the adversary's perturbations δ are constrained such that ||δ|| ∞ < ε for some positive ε. The common theme that emerges from these experiments is that there is almost always a "goldilocks zone" for ε where ε is large enough to cause significant feature-concentration, yet small enough not to damage performance (as measured by AUC or accuracy) on natural test data. We also study whether this type of modelconcentration/performance-preservation effect can be achieved using traditional 1 regularization. We find that on the toy UCI or synthetic datasets we are forced to use a very large 1 regularization parameter λ (more than 200 for example) to achieve this effect, whereas on the real-world MediaMath datasets, this effect cannot be achieved at all with 1 regularization: When λ is large enough to produce a model concentration comparable to adversarial training, the AUC is much worse, while a smaller lambda that preserves AUC produces a much inferior model concentration.
Adversarial Learning of Logistic Models in Structured Datasets
Consider a training dataset D consisting of example-label pairs (x, y) where x ∈ R d is a ddimensional example vector and y ∈ {+1, −1} is the corresponding binary label, 1 where y = 1
indicates the occurrence of a (usually relatively low probability) event. We are interested in machinelearning tasks in domains where the primary interest is in developing models that predict the probability of the event. Such models are useful for instance in advertising to predict response-rates from ad exposure, and in health-care to predict the probability of adverse events. In advertising, the probability is directly used to determine the best price to bid for an ad opportunity in a real-time-bidding system. This is in contrast to domains considered in much of the adversarial learning literature, where the emphasis is primarily on the classification produced by the model.
Note that in structured datasets several of the features may be categorical, some with large cardinalities, so we assume x represents the "exploded" feature vector where each categorical feature in the original example has been 1-hot encoded (see Section 4.2 for a detailed description of 1-hot encoding).
Let us first consider logistic models, where the predicted probabilityŷ is given by:
where σ is the sigmoid (or logistic) function σ(z) = 1 1+exp(−z) , w ∈ R d is vector of parameters to be learned, and w, x denotes the dot (inner) product of w and x. Logistic models are typically trained by minimizing the empirical risk, expressed as the expected Negative Log Likelihood (NLL) loss between the predicted probabilityŷ and the true label y:
where the NLL loss L is given by:
Note that the predictionŷ is a function of x and w, so the loss on a given example (x, y) is a function of x, y and w.
While Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) has been successfully used in a variety of domains to yield classifiers that perform well on examples drawn from the natural data distribution D, such classifiers have repeatedly been shown to be vulnerable to adversarially crafted examples (see [5] and references therein). As a result there has been a growing interest in adversarial training, i.e. training models that are robust to adversarial examples. As mentioned in the Introduction, our primary interest in adversarial training is not adversarial robustness but rather in the resulting improved model-concentration (and hence improved model-explainability).
Following [5] , for our logistic models and NLL loss, we formulate adversarial learning as the problem of minimizing the expected adversarial loss:
where ∆ is the set of possible perturbations to the input x that the adversary is allowed to make. It is common practice to consider ∆ to be the set of p -bounded perturbations. Thus minimizing expected adversarial loss results in a min-max (or saddle-point) optimization problem which is computationally demanding for general loss functions L (since for each example one must find the worst-case perturbation that maximizes the loss on that example). Fortunately, for logistic models we show in the next subsection that the inner maximization has a closed form solution, when adversarial perturbations are bounded under certain norms.
Adversarial Perturbations for Logistic Models
For brevity we will use the phrase " p (ε)-adversary" to refer to an adversary who is allowed to choose perturbations δ such that ||δ|| p ≤ ε, and we refer to such perturbations as p (ε) perturbations. In the rest of the paper, whenever we use the term "adversarial" p (ε) perturbation, it should be understood that we are referring to the worst-case perturbation δ by an p (ε) adversary, for the loss function under consideration (i.e. this perturbation achieves the inner max in Eq. (4)).
The following Lemma gives a closed form formula for the p (ε) perturbations under the logistic NLL loss, for p ∈ {2, ∞}.
Lemma 2.1 (Adversarial 2 (ε), ∞ (ε) perturbations for logistic models) For a fixed x, w ∈ R d , y ∈ {+1, −1}, positive integer p, and ε > 0, define ∆ p (ε) as the set of perturbations δ whose p norm is bounded by ε:
and define the adversarial δ as:
where L() is the logistic NLL loss defined in (3). Then
Proof: Consider the case y = +1 (the case y = −1 is analogous). In this case the NLL simplifies to − ln(σ( w, x + δ )), which is monotonically decreasing function of w, δ . Hence maximizing L(x + δ, y; w) is equivalent to minimizing w, δ . When the 2 -norm of δ is bounded by ε, w, δ is minimized when δ is such that it has 2 -norm ε and points in the direction opposite to w, which implies the first result by noting that w ||w||2 is the unit vector in the direction of w. When the ∞ -norm of δ is bounded by ε, the lowest value of w, δ is achieved when each component of δ has magnitude ε but sign opposite that of the corresponding component of w, which implies the second result.
Logistic SGD Updates for ∞ (ε) Adversarial Learning
We would like to better understand the nature of the solution to the adversarial learning problem (4) for logistic regression models. Since there is no known closed form solution to this problem, we analyze how an Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) based optimizer updates the model weights under ∞ (ε) adversarial perturbations. We assume a standard SGD setup: The weight vector w is initialized to all zeros. After each example (x, y) is encountered, 1. The input vector x is subjected to an adversarial ∞ (ε) perturbation, i.e. x is replaced by x := x + δ * where δ * is given by (8) 2. The logistic NLL loss L(x , y; w) is computed using Eq. (3), 3. Each component w i of w is updated according to the gradient of the NLL loss w.r.t. w i :
where η > 0 is the learning rate.
Since SGD is inherently a stateful process, it is challenging to analyze its sequential dynamics. Instead we analyze the expectation of the gradient updates from an arbitrary state, when the training data points (x, y) are drawn from an idealized, general data-generation process we call the Biased Coins Process (BCP), defined below. The BCP can be viewed as simulating a process where we are drawing points with replacement from an actual (finite) dataset. Our main result is Theorem 2.3 which characterizes the expected gradient updates on ∞ (ε)-adversarially perturbed BCP inputs. This result yields several insights that help explain our results on synthetic datasets (Section 3), the UCI datasets (Section 5.2) and real-world advertising datasets (Section 5.3).
In the Biased Coins Process, a data-point (x, y) is generated as follows. The label y is chosen uniformly at random from {−1, 1}, and x is a d-dimensional feature vector where for each i ∈ [d],
where b i ∈ [−0.5, 0.5] is the bias of feature x i .
We start with a Proposition showing an expression for the gradient of L(x + δ * , y; w) where δ * is the
Proposition 1 (Gradient of Logistic NLL Loss under ∞ (ε) adversarial perturbation) If L is the logistic NLL loss given by (3) , and x = x + δ * where δ * is the ∞ (ε) adversarial perturbation (8), then for each i ∈ [d] the gradient ∂L(x , y; w)/∂w i is given by:
∂L(x , y; w)
Proof: Consider first the logistic NLL loss in Eq. (3). If we write z for the dot product w, x , the loss can be written as L = ln(1 + e −yz ) = − ln(σ(yz)) where σ is the sigmoid function. Then the gradient ∂L/∂w i is given by:
where σ stands for the derivative of σ with respect to its argument, and we used the fact that σ (u) = σ(u)σ(−u). The result then follows from (12) by observing that y x , w = y x − εy sgn(w), w = y x, w − ε||w|| 1 , and
Expectation of Gradient Updates on Adversarially Perturbed BCP data
Consider an arbitrary stage of the SGD algorithm where the current weight vector is w, and we generate a data-point (x, y) according to the Biased Coins Process, and after replacing the featurevector x with x = x + δ * where δ * is the ∞ (ε) adversarial perturbation in Eq. (8), we present (x , y) to the SGD algorithm. We then ask what is the expectation of the gradient update of the weight w i ? Each w i will be updated to a new value w i − η∂L(x , y; w)/∂w i , where η > 0 is the (current) learning rate, and L is the logistic NLL loss defined in Eq. (3). For brevity we denote the change in w i by ∆w i , i.e.
In analyzing the expectaion E∆w i , we will find it useful to introduce the following quantity:
where the expectation is over data points (x, y) generated by the BCP. Note that the value of yx i ∈ {±} represents whether or not the value of feature x i is "aligned" with the label y, and yx i sgn(w i ) = 1 means that the weight of feature x i is "consistent" with its label-alignment: i.e. either yx i = 1 and sgn(w i ) > 0, or yx i = −1 and sgn(w i ) < 0. Conversely, yx i sgn(w i ) = −1 means that that the feature x i is "inconsistent" with the label. In general when yx i sgn(w i ) = s we say that "feature x i has consistency s". Further note that σ(ε||w|| 1 − y w, x ) is the model's predicted probability of the wrong label −y (on an ∞ (ε)-adversarially perturbed point data-point x = x − yε sgn(w)). We can therefore interpret σ i (s) as the "expected mis-prediction, given consistency s of feature x i ". Intuitively, the value of σ i (s) is inversely related to the model's performance on the "slice" of the BCP data where the feature x i has consistency s. Therefore in the initial stages of the SGD algorithm, we expect σ i (s) to be relatively large (i.e. closer to 1.0) and in the later stages, it will relatively small. This intuition will be useful later in Section 2.4 when we interpret the results of Theorem 2.3.
The conditional expectation σ i (s) has some useful properties which we state in this Lemma:
with equality when w i = 0 (15)
Proof: Notice that in the argument of the σ() in the expectation (14) , the only terms involving feature i are |w i | − yx i w i , and in particular the term −yx i w i is the only term that is different between σ i (−1) and σ i (1). Moreover, this term is larger in σ i (−1) by an amount 2|w i | than in σ i (1). The first property then follows from monotonicity of the sigmoid function, and the second is a consequence of the fact that for any positive h, σ(u + h) ≤ σ(u)(1 + h).
We are now ready to show the main result characterizing the expected gradient update E(∆w i )) for individual features.
Theorem 2.3 (Expectation of logistic gradient update for Biased Coins Process) Given a weight vector w ∈ R d , assuming a learning rate η = 1 (only to avoid notational clutter), if a data point (x, y) is drawn according to the Biased Coins Process above, and x = x + δ * where δ * is the ∞ (ε) adversarial perturbation given by Eq. (8), then for each i ∈ [d], the expectation (over random draws from the BCP) of the SGD update ∆w i (defined in Eq. (13)) satisfies the following properties:
Proof: From (13) and (11), since η is assumed to be 1,
, and we can compute the expectation by conditioning on the two possibilities yx i ± 1, which have respective probabilities 0.5 ± b i (from the definition of the Biased Coins Process above). Using the definition (14) of the conditional expectations σ i (1) and σ i (−1) (which are equal since w i = 0), this expectation can be written as
= 2b i σ i (1), which establishes Property 1. Now consider the case w i = 0. We want to decompose the expectation E∆w i by conditioning over two possibilities, yx i sgn(w i ) = ±1. From the definition of the Biased Coins Process, it can be seen that these possibilities occur with respective probabilities 0.5 ± b i sgn(w i ). Also, since yx i sgn(w i ) = ±1 is equivalent to yx i = ± sgn(w i ) respectively, we can write the following
where we use the definition (14) of the conditional expectations σ i (1) and
= (2b i sgn(w i ) − ε)σ i (1) where the inequality (22) is justified by the facts that σ i (−1) ≤ σ i (1) (Lemma 2.2), and that the factors in the second term in the first equation are all non-negative. This establishes the upper bound (18).
To argue the lower bound (19), we apply the inequality
, and this implies the desired lower bound since 1 − 2b i sgn(w i ) ≤ 1.
Implications of the Expected Gradient Results
Theorem 2.3 has a few interesting implications. It will help to recall from Section 2.3 that the conditional expectation σ i (s) can be interpreted as the "expected mis-prediction of the model when feature x i has consistency s", which in turn means that in the initial stages of SGD we expect σ i (s) to be relatively large, and it will shrink as SGD progresses toward a better model. Since this factor appears in all of the bounds of Theorem 2.3, the various effects discussed below are more pronounced in the initial stages of SGD and less so during later stages.
In the following interpretations, we say the weight w i of a feature x i is aligned, if sgn(w i ) sgn(b i ) = 1, and otherwise we say it is mis-aligned. We also informally say that the feature x i is "weightaligned" and "weight-mis-aligned" respectively. Also note that sgn(w i )E∆w i < 0 signifies that the expected update of weight w i shrinks it toward zero. Conversely, sgn(w i )E∆w i > 0 signifies an expansion of the weight in the current direction.
• (1). Weights grow in the right direction starting from zero. Property 1 implies that for any ε ≥ 0 (i.e. for natural as well as adversarial training) if a feature x i has weight w i = 0, the SGD update will on average "grow" its weight in the "correct" direction, i.e. in the same direction as its bias b i , and the expected magnitude of the update is 2|b i |σ i (1).
• (2). Mis-aligned weights are shrunk. When sgn(w i ) sgn(b i ) = −1, the upper bound (18) in Property 2 simplifies to
which shows that if the weight of a feature x i is mis-aligned, then its weight is shrunk toward zero on average, and the magnitude of the shrinkage is proportional to 2|b i | + ε. This makes it clear that adversarial training with a positive value of ε shrinks mis-aligned weights more aggressively than natural training (i.e. with ε = 0). 
which means that for a weight-aligned feature x i with bias b i , if the adversarial ε exceeds 2|b i |, then its weight is shrunk toward zero in expectation, and the expected magnitude of the shrinkage is proportional to ε − 2|b i |.
• (4). Aligned weights are expanded up to a point, for sufficiently small ε. When sgn(w i ) sgn(b i ) = 1, the lower bound (19 simplifies to
and this lower bound is positive if |w i | < 2|b i | and
Implications (3) and (4) are specific to adversarial training since they apply only for a certain range of non-zero values of ε. Indeed, these two implications are key to the feature-concentration effect of adversarial training which we explore in detail in the experiment sections. Suppose for example that there are two features x 1 , x 2 (in the BCP-generated data) with biases b 1 = 0.2, and b 2 = 0.001 respectively, and we adversarially train a logistic model with ε = 0.1. Then by implication (2) a negative weight on either feature will be shrunk toward zero on average. Implication (3) means that a positive weight on the "weakly biased" feature x 2 will be shrunk toward zero with a magnitude proportional to almost 0.1. Implication (4) means that a positive weight say w 1 = 0.05 on the "strongly biased" feature x 1 will be preserved or expanded since 0.05 < 2b 1 = 0.4, and ε = 0.1 can be verified to satisfy the bound (23).
More generally, if there are truly random non-predictive features in a data-set, that just happen to show spurious correlations with the label in a finite sample, these features will have much weaker biases than the truly predictive features, and so adversarial training with an appropriate ε would tend to weed out the non-predictive features. We see this phenomenon clearly in the synthetic datasets in the next section, where we intentionally construct a dataset with a mix of predictive and non-predictive random features. In the experiments on the UCI datasets (Section 5.2) and on real-world advertising datasets (Section 5.3) we also see this feature-pruning effect. In these non-synthetic experiments, it is possible that the features being pruned are either truly non-predictive ones, or very weakly biased ones. In datasets with hundreds of thousands of sparse categorical features, pruning even weakly predictive features can be valuable due to the explainability and model-size compression benefits.
Finally, implications (3) and (4) 
Experiments on Synthetic Datasets
Our analysis of the expected logistic gradient updates on the idealized Biased Coins Process shows that it should be possible for ∞ (ε)-adversarial training with an appropriate ε to prune out irrelevant, purely random features. With this in mind we construct a synthetic dataset where adversarial training weeds out non-predictive features (thus improving model concentration) much more effectively than natural training, and yet maintains "standard" accuracy close to that of a naturally trained model.
In other words, we are viewing adversarial training as essentially an alternative to natural training, and we are interested in improving feature concentration while maintaining performance on natural test data. In Section 5.1 we define various feature concentration metrics but here we will look at the metrics based on the concentration of the weights: (a) Wts.1Pct, which is the percentage of weights whose absolute values are within 1% of the highest absolute weight, and (b) Wts.L1, which is the 1 -norm of the weights, divided by the highest absolute weight. The synthetic dataset has the following distributional properties (some of which are similar to those in the synthetic dataset considered by [13] ). The label y is -1 or +1 with equal probability. The input vector x ∈ R d consists of 2 kinds of features:
Correlated, strongly predictive features : c identical features x 1 = x 2 = . . . = x c such that:
I.I.D, random non-predictive features: r i.i.d. features x c+1 , . . . , x c+r each taking the values +1/-1 with equal probability.
We show below some results with N = 1000 data-points generated according to the above specifications, with c = r = 8, i.e. 8 identical predictive features and 8 random non-predictive features.
The idea is to ensure that there are "sufficiently many" features of each type, and 8 of each suffices to highlight some of the behaviors we are discussing. The rationale for needing "sufficiently many" is the following: When there are sufficiently many random non-predictive features, some of them will accidentally "look" like they are correlated with the label: this is because in a set of N tosses of a fair coin, the expectation of the fractional imbalance between heads and tails is proportional to 1/ √ N , and the distribution of the imbalance is highly concentrated around this expectation. As a result, if there are sufficiently many random non-predictive features, at least some of them will appear correlated with the label, and so natural training will put non-negligible weights on them. Many real-world structured datasets are moderate-sized (say N under a 100,000), and even if the number of data points is very large, there may be a very large number of sparse categorical features, and thus this "spurious" correlation can occur with higher likelihood. When there are several identical, predictive features, natural model training will force these features to "share" their weight roughly equally, thus pushing down the weights to a level comparable or even less than that of non-predictive features.
For natural training we train a logistic model (with a non-zero bias term) on the first 700 data-points and tested on the remaining 300. For natural training we use a mini-batch size of 20 and train for 200 epochs, using the FTRL optimizer with a learning-rate of 0.01, and all weights initialized to zero. Adversarial training is similar except that we apply the adversarial perturbation from Eq. (8) with the bound ε = 1.0 to each example x in the mini-batch before taking gradients: The features are shown left to right in decreasing order of absolute value of naturally-trained weights. The 8 predictive features are x1, x2, . . . , x8, and the random non-predictive features x9, . . . , x16 are relabeled r1, . . . , r8 to make it easy to distinguish them. Both training modes result in equal weights on the predictive features. However natural training results in all of the non-predictive features having significant weights, with 4 of them having higher weights than the predictive features, whereas adversarial training selectively "kills off" all the non-predictive feature-weights, while retaining a significant weight on the predictive ones.
As shown in Table 1 the AUC of the adversarially trained model is slightly higher than that of the naturally-trained model, and the weight concentrated metrics Wts.L1 and Wts.1Pct are significantly better with adversarial training.
Digging deeper into the weights, especially those of the random non-predictive features, reveals a more interesting picture. The contrast between natural and adversarial training is seen dramatically in the bar-chart of Figure 1 . To make it easier to distinguish the random non-predictive features x 9 , . . . , x 16 from the predictive features x 1 , . . . x 8 , we relabel the non-predictive features as r 1 , . . . r 8 , and refer to these two feature-groups as "x-features" and "r-features" respectively. As expected, natural training results in equal weights on the 8 predictive features (and this is true for adversarial training as well). However natural training also places a significant weight on the 8 random nonpredictive features, with 4 of them having higher weights than the predictive features. This is clearly problematic from a model-explanation point of view: when explaining the predicted probability on a specific example, we would like to not see the non-relevant features contributing a meaningful amount, and especially not more than the truly predictive features. Figure 2 shows the aggregate feature-attribution metric FI (as defined in Eq. (31) in Section 4.2 later) for both training modes, and it parallels what we observed with the feature weights: The naturally trained model results in significant attribution to non-predictive features.
In sharp contrast to natural training, adversarial training does not suffer from this problem: the only significant weights are on the 8 predictive features, and all of the non-predictive feature-weights are selectively killed-off, with weights close to zero. This is also of course reflected in the aggregate feature-attribution in Figure 2 . We gain further insight into the impact of ε on the adversarially-learned model weights, by repeating the above adversarial training (and natural testing) with a range of ε-bounds from 0.0 to 2.0. For each value of ε we separately compute the 1 -norm of the learned weights of the predictive x-features, and the 1 -norm of the learned weights of the non-predictive random r-features. These are plotted in Figure 3 , along with the AUC on the 300 natural test data points. The figure shows that as ε increases, the 1 -norm of the weights of the r-features approaches zero much more rapidly than the 1 -norm of the x-features. Moreover at the level of ε where the r-feature weights approach zero, the AUC (on natural test data) is nearly as high as the AUC with natural training (ε = 0). This suggests there is a "goldilocks zone" (shown by the blue band in the figure) for ε which is "just right", i.e. large enough to de-weight non-predictive features, yet small enough to preserve sufficient weight on the predictive features and hence have minimal AUC impact on natural test data. Adversarial training with an ε value in the goldilocks zone would thus yield both good model explanations (since non-predictive features are given negligible weight) and good model performance (since naturally-trained AUC is maintained).
It is natural to wonder whether the feature-weight concentration effect of adversarial training can be achieved using traditional 1 regularization. On this specific synthetic dataset we find that indeed it is possible to achieve a similar de-weighting of the non-predictive features using 1 -regularization with, but this requires a very large weight λ on the regularization term in the loss function: it needs to be at least 200, as shown in Figure 4 . However as we show in Section 5.3, in large real-world datasets, such a high value of λ damages the AUC of the model considerably, and small λ values do not achieve a model-concentration as significant as that achieved by adversarial training.
Explanation of Adversarial Training Behavior on the Synthetic Dataset
We can now use Theorem 2.3 to at least partially explain some of the observations we made on our synthetic dataset of N = 1000 points. Our experiments used a variant of SGD with a mini-batch size of 20 on a shuffled dataset. The behavior of the SGD algorithm can be reasonably approximated by a modified process where at each stage, a single data-point is drawn uniformly at random with replacement from the N -point dataset and perturbed by the ∞ (ε) adversary, and presented to the SGD algorithm for a gradient-based update. The random draws of points from the dataset can therefore be modeled as a Biased Coins Process, with appropriate choices of the biases of each feature. Recall that in the synthetic dataset (Section 3) the 8 identical predictive features x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 8 each have a bias b i = 0.2, for i ∈ [8] . Since these will share weights equally in the optimal solution, we can reasonably approximate the overall effect of these identical predictive features, using a single feature in the BCP with bias 0.2. The 8 non-predictive features x 9 , . . . , x 16 are each independently The top plot shows the 1-norm of the predictive x feature-weights. The middle plot shows the 1-norm of random non-predictive r feature-weights. The bottom plot shows the AUC on the natural (i.e. unperturbed) test dataset. Note that ε = 0 corresponds to training on natural examples, and as we increase ε, the learned weights of the non-predictive r-features approach zero much more rapidly than those of the predictive x-features, and the ε where the r-weights approach zero still maintains the AUC of a naturally-trained model. The blue band represents the "goldilocks zone" of ε values that are "just right", i.e. adversarial training with this ε bound yields models that have both good explanations (since they eliminate non-predictive features) and good model performance (since AUC is maintained close to the naturally trained level). uniformly chosen from {−1, +1}. Thus each non-predictive feature has a probability 0.5 of agreeing or disagreeing with the label y. However in a finite sample of N data points, for a non-predictive feature, the expectation proportion of imbalance between agreements and disagreements (with the label) is of the order of 1/ √ N , and moreover the distribution of this imbalance is highly concentrated around the expectation. Therefore we can model each of these non-predictive features as a feature in the Biased Coins Process with a bias of O(1/ √ N ).
In other words, we are approximating the synthetic dataset of Section 3 with a Biased Coins Process where there is one predictive feature with bias 0.2, and 8 features with bias O(1/ √ N ). Theorem 2.3 and its implications (Section 2.4) then help us explain the following observations. (It will be helpful to see Figure 1 which shows the weights from natural and adversarial training with ε = 1.0, and Figure 3) , which shows the variation of 1 -norms of the two feature-types with varying ε.)
• Natural training (i.e. ∞ (ε)-adversarial training with ε = 0) learns non-negligible weights on at least some of the non-predictive random features, with some of them having weights even larger than predictive features. This is seen in Figure 1 . As mentioned before, since the 8 predictive features are identical, natural (and adversarial with any ε) learning results in a model where the weights are shared equally amongst them. On the other hand, many of the random non-predictive features have a bias of O(1/ √ N ). Due to implication (1) in Section 2.4, their weights grow from 0 in the direction of their bias, and due to implication (4) they are maintained or expanded in the same direction since ε = 0.0 for natural training. This effect, combined with the fact that the weights of the 8 predictive features are shared equally, causes the weights of some of the non-predictive features to exceed that of the predictive features.
• With adversarial training (ε = 1.0) the learned weights on the 8 non-predictive features are close to 0 (Figure 1 ), but the 8 predictive features retain significant weights. This is the key feature-concentration effect highlighted by these experiments. Note that ε = 1.0 far exceeds the O(1/ √ N ) bias b i of the random-non-predictive features, so by implication (2), any mis-aligned weights of these features are shrunk toward zero with an expected change proportional to ε + 2|b i |, and by implication (3) any aligned weights are also shrunk toward zero, this time with an expected change proportional to ε − 2|b i | which is close to ε since b i is O(1/ √ N ). Note that the single predictive feature has bias 0.2, so by implication (2), if its weight is mis-aligned, it shrinks toward zero with an expected change proportional to ε + 2(0.2) or 1.4, which is a much more aggressive rate than that of the non-predictive features. If the predictive feature has an aligned weight, by implication (3) it shrinks toward zero since ε = 1.0 > 0.4, and the expected change is proportional to ε − 2(0.2) = 0.6, which is a much slower rate than that of the non-predictive features. Presumably, after reaching a certain level, the weight of the predictive feature enters the regime of implication (3), which preserves its weight. This can explain why even with ε = 1.0 the weights on the predictive features remain significant.
Feature Attribution in Neural Networks
We now turn our attention to measuring feature concentration. We informally mentioned some concentration metrics earlier in Section 3 in the context of our experiments on synthetic data, such as Wts.1Pct and Wts.L1, but it is worth considering some more principled ways of measuring concentration, especially in cases where the previously-mentioned metrics do not provide a good picture of feature importances. This is particularly true in real-world datasets such as those considered in the advertising response prediction task in Section 5.3, where there are many high-cardinality categorical features, and we need an appropriate way to measure an aggregate importance of a categorical feature over a dataset. Also the weight of a numerical feature is not necessarily an adequate measure of its importance. In Section 4.2 we propose aggregate feature-importance metrics applicable to categorical as well as numerical features.
We start with the notion of Feature Attribution. Feature attribution refers to the general area of understanding how the output of a neural network is impacted by its input features, and this is important in a variety of contexts. For a neural network that computes a function F : R d → R, some examples of relevant questions are:
• On a specific input x, which features of x are "most responsible" for the value of the output F (x), relative to F (x ) for some baseline input x (such as a black image for image models, or a zero vector for logistic prediction models). Such an understanding can aid in debugging or improving a network's performance. Sample-level attribution can also be used as a rationale for a specific output. The key to a useful feature-attribution is a sound methodology which does not have quirks which obscure the impact of features on the model output. In general it is difficult to evaluate an attribution method, so in a recent paper [1] the authors identify several axioms that any sound attribution method must satisfy, and in particular propose a specific method satisfying these axioms, which they call Integrated Gradients (IG). We adopt this IG method in this paper, and it works as follows. Suppose F : R d → R represents the function computed by a neural network. Let x ∈ R d be a specific input, and x ∈ R d be the baseline input. The IG is defined as the path integral of the gradients along the straight-line path from the baseline x to the input x. The IG along the i'th dimension for an input x and baseline x is defined as:
where ∂ i F (z) denotes the gradient of F (u) along the i'th dimension, at u = z.
Closed Form for IG in 1-Layer Networks
For general neural networks, the authors show how to approximate the integral by a summation involving gradients at m equally-spaced points along the straight-line path from x to x. While this approximation is reasonably efficient for a fixed example x and dimension i, it can be prohibitively expensive for computing the IG values across a dataset of millions of examples and thousands of (sparse) features. Closed form expressions for the IG would therefore be of significant interest, especially if the goal is to compute the IG over an entire dataset in order to glean aggregate feature importances.
We first show a closed form exact expression for the IG i (x) when F (x) is a single-layer network.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose F (x) is computed by a 1-layer neural network where x ∈ R d is the ddimensional input vector, the layer weights are given by a d-dimensional vector w, the bias is b, and the final activation function is σ, which is assumed to be differentiable. We can write F (x) as
where w, x denotes the dot product of w and x. Then the Integrated Gradients for all dimensions of x relative to a baseline x are given by:
where the operator denotes the entry-wise product of vectors.
Proof: Consider the partial derivative ∂ i F (x + α(x − x )) in the definition (25) of IG i (x). For a given x, x and α, let u denote the vector x + α(x − x ). Then ∂ i F (u) = ∂F (u)/∂u i , and by applying the chain rule we get:
where σ (u) is the gradient of the activation σ at u. This implies that:
We can therefore write dF (u) = x − x , w σ (u)dα, and since x − x , w is a scalar, this yields
Using this equation the integral in the definition of IG i (x) can be written as
where (27) follows from the fact that (x − x ) and w do not depend on α. Therefore from the definition (25) of IG i (x):
and this yields the expression (26) for IG(x).
Two commonly used models fall within the class of 1-layer networks described in Lemma 4.1: Logistic models where the activation function σ is the sigmoid (or logistic) function σ(z) = 1/(1 + e −z ), and Poisson regression models where the activation is σ(z) = e z . Logistic and Poisson models are members of the more general class of Generalized Linear Models and the lemma applies to these models as well. Note that the closed form expression (26) does not depend on the activation derivative σ at all, as long as the activation σ is differentiable.
There is a natural interpretation of the closed form expression (26): When the input changes from the baseline value x to x, the dot product changes by w, x − x , and the fractional contribution of dimension i is f i := wi(xi−x i ) w, x−x , and IG i (x) is this fraction f i times the total function value change
Aggregation of IG Over a Dataset
The IG methodology of [1] only considers feature attribution for a single example x. In order to understand the relative importance of features over a (possibly large) dataset, it would be helpful to somehow aggregate the IG values across multiple examples. We propose here a simple method to do this in structured datasets.
In ad conversion prediction and other domains involving structured datasets, several (or even most) features can be categorical. With this in mind, we introduce some notation. We assume here that all categorical features are 1-hot encoded before models are trained on the dataset.
An example vector in original form (i.e. prior to one-hot encoding of categorical features) is denoted u, and u k refers to the k'th feature (which could be numerical or categorical). If feature u k is categorical, then V k denotes the set of possible values of the feature, i.e. V k represents the "vocabulary" of this feature. The cardinality of feature u k is m k := |V k |. We assume that V k is in index form, i.e. regardless of what the actual feature values are, we assume they are represented as indices in [m k ] := {1, 2, . . . , m k }. For example if u k is the dayOfWeek feature, it has the 7 possible values V k = [7] = {1, 2, . . . , 7}, and its cardinality m k is 7. Sometimes cardinalities can be much larger. For example in the advertising datasets we study in our experiments, a website URL is encoded as an integer siteID, which has cardinality around 50, 000.
For a categorical feature u k , its 1-hot representation is denoted h k and is obtained by starting with an m k -dimensional vector of all zeros, and setting dimension i to 1, where i is the value of u k . For example if u k = 2 and its cardinality m k = 4, then h k is the vector < 0, 1, 0, 0 >. For notational convenience, for a numerical feature u k , we let h k = u k denote its "one-hot encoding", which is identical to u k . For a feature-vector (in original form) u =< u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u d >, we let x represent the vector resulting from concatenating the 1-hot encoding h k of each u k in the natural way:
We then say that x is in exploded form. For example suppose u =< u 1 , u 2 , u 3 > is a 3-dimensional feature vector in original form, u 1 is categorical with cardinality m 1 = 3, u 2 is numerical, and u 3 is categorical with cardinality m 3 = 2. If u =< 2, 3.5, 1 >, then the exploded form x after 1-hot transformation is:
We use I k to denote the (contiguous) set of dimensions corresponding to the original feature u k , in the exploded vector x. In the above example I 1 = {1, 2, 3}, I 2 = {4}, and I 3 = {5, 6}.
We can now describe our IG aggregation procedure. As mentioned before, we assume that the neural network input is an exploded-form vector x. Note that the i'th dimension of x corresponds either to a numeric feature in the original feature-vector u, or some specific value of a categorical feature. The Integrated Gradient for each dimension i of x can be computed from Eq. (25) for a general neural network, or from Eq. (26) for a 1-layer network. Informally, IG i (x) measures the extent to which the i'th dimension of x contributed to "moving" the network output from its baseline value F (x ) to F (x). In other words IG i (x) represents the impact of the i'th dimension on the output for example x. A reasonable measure of the "importance" of dimension i in some suitable dataset D is therefore the simple average of |IG i (x)| over all x ∈ D. We call this the feature-value impact FVI (since the i'th dimension in exploded space corresponds to a specific value of a categorical feature, or a numeric feature):
In the case of a categorical feature, we are also interested in the overall impact of that feature. For example we may want to know what is the overall importance of the dayOfWeek feature in some dataset D. A reasonable way to compute the feature-impact FI k , i.e. the overall importance of a categorical feature u k in original form, is to add the FVI i values over all dimensions i corresponding to this feature in the exploded space:
Experiments
We perform experiments on three kinds of datasets: (a) synthetic datasets created to showcase specific effects, and provide a starting point for future theoretical analysis, (b) the toy datasets from the UCI ML data repository, and (c) large-scale real-world ad conversion-prediction datasets from MediaMath.
The aim of these experiments is to compare results from natural training and adversarial training. We compare performance metrics on natural test data, as well as "model concentration" metrics, all of which are described below in Section 5.1.
One important point to note is that we apply adversarial perturbations to the input vector x in exploded form, i.e. after 1-hot encoding. A natural question is whether such perturbations are semantically meaningful, and whether they represent legitimate perturbations by an adversary. One could also make the argument that a real adversary would only be able to perturb the original input vector, and so the set of allowed perturbations of x should be restricted to legitimate 1-hot encodings. Indeed some authors have considered this type of restriction in the domain of malware detection [15] . We set aside this issue in this paper, since our interest is more in the regularization effect of adversarial training, and less in robustness to real attacks.
In all our experiments, when we use the closed-form formula in Eq. 26 to compute the FVI (FeatureValue Impact) values (Eq (30)) of the dimensions of the exploded feature-vector, for the baseline input x we use the all-zeros vector.
Model Training and Evaluation Methodology
We describe here the common aspects of the training and evaluation methodology for all 3 types of datasets. Any variations specific to the datasets are described in the respective subsections. All the tasks we consider are probability prediction tasks as described in Section 2, where the prediction target is a binary +1/-1 variable, with +1 indicating a positive example and -1 indicating a negative example. (The specific implementations may actually use a 0/1 label instead, but we keep the -1/1 description here as it simplifies some of the analytical expressions). All categorical variables are 1-hot encoded prior to being fed to the model-training and evaluation code. Our code is implemented in Python using the high-level TensorFlow Estimators and Dataset APIs.
Each dataset is divided into train and test subsets. For training on natural examples we use the FTRL optimizer with L1 and L2 regularization strengths (lambdas) set to 0. (We vary the regularization lambdas to evaluate the effect of L1/L2 regularization). All model weights are initialized to zero in case of the synthetic and toy UCI datasets, whereas they are initialized using a Gaussian initializer in the case of the MediaMath ad response-prediction models. For adversarial training we also use the FTRL optimizer, except that in each mini-batch the examples x are perturbed according to the worst-case perturbation given by Eq. 8 for an ∞ -bounded adversary, for a given ε bound. Some authors train adversarially robust models by first training on natural examples and then training on adversarial examples. But in our experiments we find that the initial pre-training on natural examples does not make a difference, at least for the model-concentration effects which we are studying.
Once a model is trained (adversarially or naturally) we compute two types of metrics:
• An ML performance metric, the AUC-ROC (Area Under the ROC Curve) on the held-out test dataset
• A few feature concentration metrics, defined as follows, where the linear model weightvector is w ∈ R d (and d is the dimension of the exploded feature-space, i.e. after 1-hot encoding).
Wts.L1: ||w|| 1 /||w|| ∞ , which is a measure of the overall magnitude of the weights, scaled by the biggest absolute weight. Note that if we multiply all weights by a constant factor, then WtsL1 does not change. Wts.1Pct: The percent of the weights in w whose absolute value is at least 1% of the maximum absolute weight. This can be thought of as a measure of how many featureweights are "significant", where the threshold of significance is 1% of the biggest absolute weight. FI.L1: ||F I|| 1 /||F I|| ∞ , where the Feature Impact FI i is defined by Eq 31, and i ranges over the dimensions in the original feature-space (i.e. before 1-hot encoding), and the dataset D is the natural training dataset. FI.1Pct: The percent of components of FI (which are all positive by definition) that are at least 1% of the biggest component of FI, again over the natural training dataset.
In the various tables of results, we use the abbreviation nat to refer to metrics for the naturally-trained model, and adv to refer to metrics for the adversarially-trained model.
Experiments on some UCI datasets
We now describe experiments on datasets in the popular UCI repository of ML datasets. We show details of experiments on two of these datasets: • The mushroom dataset consists of 8142 instances, each of which corresponds to a different mushroom species, and has 22 categorical features (and no numerical features), whose cardinalities are all under 10. The task is to classify an instance as edible (label=1) or not (label=0).
• The spambase dataset consists of 4601 instances with 57 numerical attributes (and no categorical ones). The instances are various numerical features of a specific email, and the task is classify the email as spam (label = 1) or not (label = 0).
In each case our training and testing methodology is similar to that used on the synthetic datasets: we split the dataset randomly into a 70% training dataset and a 30% test dataset. We train a logistic model using the FTRL optimizer (where the strength λ of 1 regularization can be adjusted), with all weights initialized to zero. Prior to training and testing, we standardize each numerical feature using its mean and standard deviation in the training dataset. For adversarial training we assume each input x is perturbed by an adversary who is allowed to shift x by a vector δ whose ∞ -norm is bounded by ε. In particular for a given ε we use the closed-form worst-case perturbation formula in Eq. (8), and we set the 1 regularization parameter λ to 0.
Mushroom Dataset
Similar to the plot in Figure 3 for the synthetic dataset, in Figure 5 we show how varying the ε bound on an ∞ adversary impacts the weight-concentration (measured by Wts.1Pct, defined in Section 5.1) and the AUC, in order to demonstrate that there is a range of ε values that represents a "goldilocks" zone where there is a significant feature-concentration effect while maintaining the (test-set) AUC within 0.01 of the naturally-trained AUC. With adversarial training using ε = 1.6 the Wts.1Pct value is only 12% (compared to almost 97% for a naturally-trained model) while AUC (on natural test data) is 0.99, a drop of only 0.01 compared to a naturally trained model. Figure 4 for the synthetic dataset we also show in Figure 6 how varying the 1 -regularization strength parameter λ impacts AUC and Wts.1Pct (in natural training, i.e. ε = 0). The figure shows that the highest λ value that maintains an AUC above 0.99 is 600, yet it achieves a Wts.1Pct of around 18%, still significantly higher than the 12% achieved with adversarial training using ε = 1.6. parameter λ. Even with a λ = 600, the Wts.1Pct concentration metric is around 18%, considerably higher than the 12% achieved with adversarial training.
As in
We now want to show the contrast between the weights learned by natural training and adversarial training with ε = 1.6. Since all features in this dataset are categorical, many with cardinalities close to 10, there are too many features in the "exploded" space to allow a clean display, so we instead look at the aggregate Feature Impact (FI, defined in Eq (31)) over the natural training dataset, see Figure 7 . It is worth noting that several features that have a significant impact on the naturally-trained model have essentially no impact on the adversarially trained model. Figures 8 and 9 show the drop-off curves of the feature-weights and FI metrics respectively, and once again it is evident that the drop offs are much steeper with adversarial training compared to natural training. resulting from natural and adversarial training, for the mushroom dataset. In each curve, the y-coordinate of a point at percent p equals the feature-weight at the p'th percentile when the weights are arranged in decreasing absolute value. Both curves are truncated when the FI reaches 1% of the highest FI in the model. The adversarially trained model has a much steeper FI drop-off, with only 36% being above the 1% threshold, compared to 90% with natural training.
Spambase dataset
As with the mushroom dataset, we start by looking at the impact of varying ε (the adversarial ∞ bound) on the concentration metric Wts.1Pct, see Figure 10 . From the chart it is apparent that an adversarially trained model ε = 0.6 achieves a concentration metric Wts.1Pct of around 53% (meaning that 53% of the model's absolute weights are within 1% of the biggest absolute weight), compared to 96% for a naturally-trained model, and yet yields an AUC (on natural test data) of 0.964, which is no more than 0.01 worse than the AUC of 0.974 for a naturally-trained model. regularization parameter λ, for the spambase dataset. Even with a λ = 200, the Wts.1Pct concentration metric is as high as 80% (significantly worse than the 53% for adversarial training), and any higher value of λ pushes the AUC to a level worse than 0.01 below the naturally-trained AUC with no regularization.
We now fix ε = 0.6 for adversarial training and show in Figures 12 and 13 the bar-plots comparing the weights and Feature-Impacts (FI) respectively, between naturally-trained and adversarially-trained models. Since all features are numerical the number of weights is the same as the number of FIs. However the distribution of the FIs does not follow that of the weights. for a naturally-trained and adversarially-trained model. In each curve, the y-coordinate of a point at percent p equals the feature-weight at the p'th percentile when the weights are arranged in decreasing absolute value. Both curves are truncated when the FI reaches 1% of the highest FI in the model. The adversarially trained model has a much steeper FI drop-off, with only 52% being above the 1% threshold, compared to 96% with natural training.
Experiments with MediaMath Datasets: Ad Conversion Prediction
MediaMath provides a software platform that operates a real-time bidding (RTB) engine which responds to bid-opportunities sent by ad-exchanges. The RTB engine bids on behalf of advertisers who set up ad-campaigns on the platform. A key component in determining bid prices is a prediction of the probability that a consumer exposed to the advertiser's campaign would subsequently perform a certain designated action (called a "conversion"). MediaMath currently trains a logistic regression model for each campaign to generate these conversion probability predictions. The models are trained on a dataset collected over a number of days, where each record contains various features related to the ad opportunity (such as device type, browser, location, time of day etc), as well as a 0/1 label indicating whether or not a conversion occurred subsequent to ad exposure. The model for each campaign is trained on a sequence of 18 days of data, and validated/tested on the subsequent 3 days of data. The total number of records in each dataset can range from half million to 50 million depending on the campaign. Each record has around 100 features, mostly categorical, and some (such as "siteID") have cardinalities as high as 100,000, and so the dimension of the exploded feature-space (i.e. after 1-hot encoding) is on the order of 400,000. (We use feature-hashing rather than explicit 1-hot encoding to map some of the high-cardinality features to a lower-dimensional vector, but the net effect is similar to 1-hot encoding, except that now each dimension in the 1-hot encoding vector may correspond to multiple features, due to hash collisions) Given the extremely high dimensionality of the exploded feature-space, it is of considerable practical importance to understand which features have a truly significant impact on the predictions. Specifically, we wish to explore whether adversarial training can yield models that have significantly better feature concentration, while maintaining the AUC within say 0.01 of the naturally-trained model. We have seen strong evidence that this is indeed possible, both on synthetic datasets (Section 3) and on some UCI datasets (Section 5.2). We show below that we see a similar phenomenon in the conversion-prediction models.
To study the impact of adversarial training (with ∞ -norm of perturbations bounded by some ε), we performed experiments with a wide range of values of ε and found that for most campaigns, adversarial training with ε = 0.01 or ε = 0.001 results in feature-concentrations significantly better than with natural training, while maintaining AUC (on the validation set) within 0.01 of the AUC of a naturally-trained model. We also experimented with keeping ε = 0 and varying the 1 -regularization parameter λ in the FTRL optimizer, and found that any λ > 0.2 significantly lowers the AUC of the resulting model, and lower λ values do not yield a feature-concentration as strong as that achieved by adversarial training. Indeed we find that the effects of adversarial training and 1 regularization are complementary: when an appropriate value of ε is used in conjunction with say λ = 0.01, we find that 1 regularization helps to "clean" up the very low feature-weights produced by adversarial training by pushing them to zero. Table 2 shows a summary of results on 9 campaigns 2 . In some cases the AUC of the adversariallytrained model is better than that of the naturally-trained model. Recall that the Wts.1Pct metric measures what percent of dimensions (in the exploded space, after 1-hot encoding) have absolute weights at least 1 percent of the highest absolute weight. Since most features are categorical, Wts.1Pct is therefore a measure of what percent of feature-values are significant to the model. This metric (as well as Wts.L1) falls drastically with adversarial training in all cases, which indicates that several of the feature-values are simply not relevant to predicting the label. There is thus a potentially massive model-compression that can be done, and this can have benefits in storing, updating and serving models (MediaMath periodically trains around 40,000 models). Table 2 also shows the FI.1Pct and FI.L1 metrics, which are aggregate feature-impact concentration metrics over the natural training dataset. Note that these are at the feature level and not feature-value level. Since the FI measure of a categorical feature aggregates the FVI metric over all values of this feature, the drop in this metric (when we go from natural to adversarial training) is not as dramatic as in the case of Wts.L1 or Wts.1Pct (and sometimes these are higher than with natural training). Table 2 : Comparison of AUC and feature-concentration between natural and adversarial training on 9 advertising campaigns. The 4 concentration metrics are defined in Section 5.1. Note that while the AUC is computed on the natural validation set, the concentration metrics FI.1Pct and FI.L1 are computed on the natural training dataset. In some campaigns, such as 285, 735 the Wts.1Pct metric improves by a factor of more than 24.
To illustrate the effect of adversarial training in more detail, we focus on campaign number 735 (the bottom row in Table 2 ) and compare the results from natural training and adversarial training (with ε = 0.01). Figure 16 compares the Feature Impact (FI) values between these models; Figure  17 compares the feature-weights drop-off curves of these models; and Figure 18 compares the FI drop-off curves. In each curve the y-coordinate of the point corresponding to a percent p equals the weight of the feature at the p'th percentile when the weights are arranged in decreasing absolute value. Each curve is truncated when the weight reaches 1% of the highest weight in the respective model. The adversarially trained model has a much steeper weight drop-off, with only 0.5% being above the 1% threshold, compared to 12% with natural training (this is consistent with Table 2 ). for a naturally-trained and adversarially-trained model (with ε = 0.01), for Campaign 735. In each curve the y-coordinate of the point corresponding to a percent p equals the weight of the feature at the p'th percentile when the weights are arranged in decreasing absolute value. Each curve is truncated when the FI reaches 1% of the highest FI in the respective model. The adversarially trained model has a much steeper FI drop-off, with only 0.75% being above the 1% threshold, compared to 1.87% with natural training. (this is consistent with Table 2 ).
Figures 19 and 20 contrast the ability of adversarial training and 1 regularization to improve model concentration while maintaining AUC (on natural test data): adversarial training with ε0.01 improves the concentration metric Wts.1Pct to as low as 0.5% (compared to 12% for a naturally trained model, an improvement factor as high as 24), and yet achieves an AUC slightly higher than with natural training. On the other hand with 1 regularization, using a strength of λ = 0.2 improves the concentration to 5% (significantly worse than 0.5% for adversarial training) and slightly improves upon the naturally-trained AUC, but any higher value of λ significantly degrades the AUC, and the Wts.1Pct concentration metric does not go below 2.5%. regularization parameter λ, for campaign 735. For a λ = 0.2, the Wts.1Pct concentration metric is as high as 5% (significantly worse than the 0.5% for adversarial training), and any higher value of λ significantly degrades the AUC.
Conclusion and Future Work
We considered the question of whether adversarial learning can be used as a mechanism to trim models significantly, while maintaining performance (as measured by AUC or accuracy) on natural (unperturbed) test data. From an explainability standpoint, it is highly desirable that models do not heavily weigh features that are irrelevant or marginally influential. We explored this possibility of feature-concentration both theoretically and empirically, in the context of logistic regression models and ∞ -bounded adversaries. On the theory side, we derived results showing bounds on the expectation of the weight updates, in terms of the adversarial ε bound, the feature's bias, its current weight, and the current overall learning stage of the model. Our results suggest there is often a goldilocks zone of adversarial ε bounds that are "just right": large enough to weed out irrelevant features, yet small enough to maintain reasonable weights on truly predictive ones and hence not impact model performance on natural test data.
Our theory both motivates and at least partially explains our experimental studies. We designed a synthetic dataset containing a mix of predictive features and random non-predictive features, and showed that natural learning tends to learn significant weights on the non-predictive features (some of which are higher than that of the predictive features) simply because they show spurious correlations with the label in a finite sample of data. By contrast adversarial training with a large enough ε bound can weed out these noise features while maintaining weights on the predictive features, hence minimally impacting (if at all) the model's performance on natural test data.
We demonstrate the feature-pruning effect of adversarial training on two toy UCI datasets and realworld advertising response-prediction datasets from MediaMath. On the latter datasets we showed that adversarial training with ∞ perturbations with ε bounds as small as 0.001 o 0.01 can achieve as much as a factor of 20 reduction in the number of "significant" weights (defined as the number of weights whose magnitudes are within 1% of the maximum magnitude), and yet their performance on natural test data is not impacted, and sometimes even improves upon natural training.
We also showed that this effect is not easily replicated with 1 -regularization. In particular we showed that in the synthetic and toy UCI datasets, one needs to use an unusually-large value of the regularization-weight λ, whereas there is no λ that achieves a comparable effect in the real-world MediaMath datasets.
To speed up adversarial training we relied on our closed-form formula for the worst-case adversarial perturbation for logistic models. We quantified feature-concentration in a few different ways, including some that are based on the model weights, and some derived from the Integrated-Gradient (IG) based feature-attribution method. We derived a closed-form formula for the IG-based featureattribution, for 1-layer neural networks, which we leverage to be able to compute a new metric of aggregate feature importance we introduced, called Feature Impact.
It would be of significant interest to expand our theoretical analysis of adversarial learning, and in particular show a link to accuracy (which is something we did not do, unlike the analysis of [5] ). Also, a nice result would be to precisely show why 1 regularization does not achieve a feature-pruning effect comparable to adversarial learning. Deriving closed form formulas (or efficient approximations) for adversarial perturbations, as well as feature-attributions, for more complex networks would also help make adversarial training and measurement of aggregate feature impact more practical.
Another direction for exploration is to consider more carefully the notion of an adversarial perturbation in structured datasets (a point that was alluded to at the beginning of Section 5). In image domains, an adversarial perturbation is one that preserves perceptual similarity (from a human observer's perspective) and yet causes a model to misclassify the example. We have side-stepped this issue in this paper since our primary motivation was to study the model-concentration effects of adversarial learning. However even for this specific purpose, it may be useful to consider other classes of permissible perturbations, such as perturbations that are constrained to be valid inputs when the features are categorical (for example [15] consider this type of restriction for adversarially robust detection malware detection). In our experiments, we perturb the 1-hot encoded vector along all dimensions, which will in general result in a vector that is not a valid representation of any input vector (since multiple dimensions corresponding to a single categorical feature may be non-zero). It is possible that such constrained perturbations produce even better results from a model-concentration point of view.
